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6 July 1961

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

6 July 1961

**T H E   W E E K   I N   B R I E F****EAST-WEST RELATIONS . . . . . Page 1**

Moscow's most recent reiteration that a German peace treaty "must be signed this year" was contained in the Soviet - North Vietnamese communiqué of 4 July. The Soviet leadership, however, has continued to provide signs of its interest in keeping open the possibility of negotiations on Berlin and Germany. This was evident in the Soviet handling of the exchange of messages with the US on Independence Day; moreover, there was an unusually large turnout of top Soviet leaders at the American Embassy reception in Moscow on 4 July. In the US-Soviet disarmament talks, which will be resumed on 17 July in Moscow, the Soviet representative has repeated his position that further negotiations in a new forum would be desirable only if agreement is reached on a statement of the goals for these talks, including an agreed "program" for complete disarmament. The Soviet note of 5 July on the nuclear test ban negotiations strongly reaffirmed the Soviet position and charged the US with preparing a justification for resuming tests.

**LAOS . . . . . Page 3**

Bloc delegates at Geneva are pressing for consideration of drafts on Laotian neutrality and are refusing to discuss Western control proposals. The contending factions in Laos continue to mark time while awaiting further talks between the three princes on the formation of a coalition government, and a recent effort to revive the Namone talks proved unsuccessful. Military activity remains at a low level, but scattered guerrilla actions continue and small-scale enemy attacks were reported to the north of Vientiane and Pak Sane.

**FRANCE-ALGERIA . . . . . Page 6**

The violent demonstrations by the Moslems in Algeria in response to the PAG's call for a day of "national struggle" against partition of Algeria give strong backing to the PAG's refusal either to discuss partition of Algeria or to consider separation of its Saharan territories. The demonstrations serve as a warning of the tactics the PAG could use to oppose an actual French attempt at partition, which De Gaulle's recent speeches have suggested would be his next move if negotiations fail. Increasingly skeptical that new talks would be productive, the PAG reportedly is again preparing to bring the Algerian issue before the UN in September.

**SECRET**

1

**BRIEFS**

**SECRET**

## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

6 July 1961

KUWAIT . . . . . Page 8

It is unlikely that Iraq will attempt military action against Kuwait in view of the substantial British military build-up there. However, Qasim might make a dramatic gesture such as the severance of diplomatic relations with Britain or nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company. Arab criticism--echoed by the bloc--of the British military intervention is increasing; at the UN, both the USSR and the UAR have demanded that British troops be withdrawn from Kuwait. [REDACTED]

25X1

SOUTH KOREA . . . . . Page 10

Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui, architect of the 16 May South Korean military coup, now has established himself openly as the strong man of South Korea. On 3 July he ousted Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong, a potential source of opposition, and three other officers of doubtful loyalty to himself from the ruling Supreme Council of National Reconstruction. There are indications that Pak may next attempt to reduce the influence of younger officers who supported his rise to power but who he may feel are trying to impose their own views rather than follow his direction. Such a move by Pak could precipitate a bitter and possibly violent struggle. [REDACTED]

25X1

CONGO . . . . . Page 11

Leopoldville politicians have still not adopted a common front on the policy to be followed toward the Stanleyville and Elisabethville regimes. Interior Minister Adoula is pressing for an early reconvening of parliament, but Mobutu and Foreign Minister Bomboko are advocating "further consultations" among anti-Gizenga politicians. The Katanga parliament, meanwhile, has repudiated most of the agreements made by Tshombé in Leopoldville. Reports of political collaboration between Tshombé and Mobutu, who will visit Katanga shortly, are contributing to unsettle the atmosphere further. [REDACTED]

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CUBA . . . . . Page 12

25X1

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

6 July 1961

**EAST GERMAN DISCONTENT . . . . . Page 14**

The East German people are showing concern that Ulbricht's signature of a separate peace treaty with the USSR will destroy any chance for German reunification, curb East German access to West Berlin, and mean the continuation of their drab living standard. Food supply difficulties appear to have intensified long-standing dissatisfaction with Ulbricht among middle- and low-level party functionaries, who reportedly attribute the shortages to the regime's agricultural policies. Industrial workers in some districts appear unresponsive to regime propaganda. At the party central committee meeting of 3-4 July the regime moved to meet these problems by assigning high priority to the improvement of the living standard and instituting a shake-up in the top economic planning apparatus.

**CROP AND LIVESTOCK PROSPECTS IN THE USSR . . . . . Page 16**

Prospects for Soviet agriculture in 1961 appear to be better than average. An unusually mild winter and a favorable spring should assure a good winter grain crop in the European USSR, and larger herds and better feed supplies point to a somewhat better year for the livestock industry than 1960. Prospects for spring grain, however, are still uncertain, particularly in the important New Lands area, where soil moisture reserves are low.

**YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER TO VISIT MOSCOW . . . . . Page 17**

Yugoslav Foreign Minister Popovic will begin a visit to the Soviet Union on 7 July at a time of uneasiness in bloc-Yugoslav relations. Moscow probably will make a special effort to gain support for its policy on Germany, and may hope to influence the neutralist conference this September in Yugoslavia. The USSR will not find Popovic easy to deal with, primarily because Belgrade's hand has been strengthened by the neutrals' increased ability during the past year to act collectively on the international scene.

**COMMUNIST CHINA'S 40TH PARTY ANNIVERSARY . . . . . Page 18**

Peiping played down the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist party on 1 July, probably primarily because of its domestic economic difficulties did not permit it to indulge in the claims of achievement customary on such occasions. It does not appear that the USSR will provide the help Peiping needs to solve its economic problems; the communiqué signed on 19 June at the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet economic talks indicates that neither side was satisfied with the results and that economic relations have not been restored to their former state.

**SECRET**

iii

**BRIEFS**

**SECRET**

## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

6 July 1961

## PEIPING ACCENTS PEACEFUL APPROACH TO TAIWAN ISSUE . . . . Page 20

Chinese Communist leaders have seized several opportunities recently to re-emphasize Peiping's peaceful approach to the Taiwan issue. Mao Tse-tung, for example, has asserted that he has no intention of "shooting his way into a strong point like Taiwan," and a leading foreign policy spokesman has declared that Peiping does not intend to take the island by armed force since such a course might lead to world war. However, in pursuing this "peaceful" tactic--probably dictated by recognition of the present limitations of its strength--Peiping does not preclude the use of force if a suitable occasion should arise. [REDACTED]

25X1

## JAPANESE REACTION TO PRIME MINISTER'S US VISIT . . . . . Page 22

Japanese observers view Prime Minister Ikeda's talks with President Kennedy as the beginning of a period of full-fledged participation in world affairs that will require Japan to accept increased international responsibilities. Press coverage of the visit was unusually favorable; most of Japan's political observers believe the trip has improved Ikeda's domestic position. [REDACTED]

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## EARLY INDEPENDENCE SEEN FOR KENYA . . . . . Page 23

London's announcement on 28 June that a new constitution for Kenya will be discussed this year suggests that early independence is being considered for the East African colony. In an attempt to secure the cooperation of African political parties, the British probably will soon release Jomo Kenyatta--the hero of Kenya's Africans who has been under detention for seven years for his alleged role in managing the Mau Mau terrorist movement. However, Kenyatta's return to active political life would intensify fears among the minority tribes of Kikuyu domination, bring about the eclipse of some relatively moderate leaders, and cause many Europeans and Asians to leave the colony. [REDACTED]

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## GREEK POLITICAL SITUATION . . . . . Page 24

Passage of a new electoral law by Parliament on 23 June has introduced pre-election atmosphere in Greece. The government may schedule elections for this fall; in any event, they must be held by May 1962. The new law provides for a system of "reinforced proportional representation" for the forthcoming election but stipulates that all subsequent elections will be held under a majority system favored by the present government. The moderately conservative party of Premier Karamanlis remains the strongest political force in Greece, followed by the Communist-front EDA. The non-Communist opposition is fragmented, and some of its leaders may collaborate with EDA. [REDACTED]

25X1

**SECRET**

iv

BRIEFS



## SECRET

## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

WEEKLY REVIEW

## EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Moscow's handling of the exchange of telegrams with the US on Independence Day appears to have been intended as a sign of the Kremlin's interest in keeping open the channel of communication established at Vienna, despite the strident Soviet line on Berlin. Although Khrushchev's telegram to the President referred to the "urgent solution of problems" left by the war--i.e., Germany and Berlin--his greeting adopted a cordial tone, referred favorably to the Vienna meeting, and concluded with the assertion that "the Soviet and American peoples by right must go down in history" as having made a "decisive contribution" to peace.

The turnout of the top Soviet leaders at the American Embassy reception on 4 July and Khrushchev's public display of conviviality also suggest an effort to keep tension over Berlin below a level which would foreclose the chance of negotiations.

Soviet officials in private remarks had earlier pointed to the possibility of negotiating on Berlin. Arkady Sobolev, a top Foreign Ministry official and former ambassador to the UN, told the British ambassador that a hopeful sign was the fact that both Khrushchev and the President on the same day had made references to negotiations. In a brief discussion with Ambassador Thompson, Deputy Foreign Minister Firiyubin and his wife, presidium member Furtseva, indicated their concern over the Berlin situation but stated that it was necessary to be "sensible" about the problem. Furtseva also told the Canadian ambassador that it was necessary to settle the Berlin problem this "or next" year.

Moscow, however, has maintained its public position that

a treaty with Germany must be concluded this year. The joint Soviet - North Vietnamese communiqué of 4 July stated that further postponement was intolerable and that a treaty "must be signed this year."

Soviet and most European satellite commentaries on the President's statement on Berlin have also adopted the general line that negotiations have become a distinct possibility, as a result of the President's remarks and Khrushchev's speech of 28 June.

Both Radio Moscow and the TASS account published in Pravda highlighted the President's "allegation" that the Soviet proposals were a threat to European and American security and that the United States was determined to defend its vital interests in Berlin. Equal prominence, however, was given to the President's reported willingness to discuss the issues. Warsaw speculated that a conference would materialize, probably at the foreign ministers' level.

Soviet press reporting of Western reaction to Khrushchev's 28 June speech also gave the impression that attention was focusing on negotiations over Berlin. Pravda's editorial of 30 June made this point by stating: "It is now the turn of statesmen of all interested countries to find mutually acceptable solutions by means of negotiations."

Disarmament

In the final sessions before recessing until the next meetings in Moscow on 17 July the Soviet representative at the Soviet-American disarmament discussions adhered closely to his earlier position. He reiterated that negotiations in a multilateral forum would be desirable only if agreement were reached on a program for complete and general disarmament.

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

In a final lengthy recapitulation of Moscow's position, Soviet chief representative Zorin stressed that the best way to proceed would be to consider specific proposals, that complete and general disarmament was the only solution, and that the USSR remained prepared to accept any US controls if the Soviet disarmament scheme were accepted.

In answer to a series of US questions, Zorin provided some evidence that the Soviet objective was a general statement along the lines of the Indian resolution submitted at the last General Assembly. He indicated that this resolution might provide common ground for an agreement, if the United States was prepared to work on both a full treaty and certain initial measures without prejudicing the goal of complete and general disarmament. He asked whether the US could accept the Indian resolution or at least part of it.

This line suggests that when the talks resume in Moscow the USSR may intend to propose a dual approach. The Soviets previously have hinted that they might be inclined toward two sets of disarmament talks, covering initial measures in one conference and a complete treaty in the other. Such an approach would be used by Moscow as an opportunity to support the pro-

posals to incorporate the nuclear test ban as a first step in the context of general disarmament, and thereby attempt to prolong the current negotiations in Geneva.

The Soviet note of 5 July, replying to the US note of 17 June on the nuclear test ban negotiations, strongly reaffirmed the uncompromising Soviet stand and charged the US with attempting to delay indefinitely the conclusion of an agreement not only on nuclear testing but also on general disarmament. In a long polemic, Moscow accused the US of being interested only in preparing a justification for resuming tests.

The note contended that the US made a nuclear test ban a preliminary condition to general disarmament in order to disrupt negotiations on both issues. It further claimed that hopes for a re-examination of the "obstructionist" policy of the previous US administration had not been justified.

On the issues involved, the note repeated the same general line of the Vienna memorandum of 4 June and defended the Soviet "troika" proposals. It contained no indication that the USSR would break off the Geneva talks at this time.

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

## LAOS

The Communist bloc is continuing to represent the Zurich communiqué as evidence of a significant reconciliation of the three rival Laotian factions and is pressing at Geneva for acceptance of the statement as an "official" declaration of Laotian neutrality. In an apparent effort to sidetrack any discussion of Western control proposals for Laos, Soviet delegate Pushkin on 29 June proposed to the senior UK delegate that the conference consider neutrality drafts.

The Polish representative followed up by calling on the conference in an address on 30 June to adopt the Zurich decisions as the basis for a declaration of neutrality. Communist China's Foreign Minister Chen Yi on 3 July forcefully underscored the bloc's contention that discussion of neutrality drafts be the next order of business.

Pushkin agreed to meet with British and Canadian delegates on 2 July to review the latest instruction to the International Control Commission (ICC) from the Geneva co-chairmen, but he maintained stiff opposition to any change in the note and in fact reserved the right to withdraw it because the UK had stopped the message in transmission. The note, which was the result of weeks of wrangling over the ICC's lack of equipment to carry out its task in Laos, provided that materiel and trans-

portation for the commission would be supplied by the three Laotian factions. This aspect of the agreement, to which the Canadians raised strong objections, would in effect give the Pathet Lao forces a veto over the movement of the ICC.

The Chinese Communist announcement on 3 July that Chen Yi was being recalled to Peiping stated that he would return to Geneva at "any time conditions warrant it." In his farewell address to the conference Chen warned that the present state of affairs "must not continue any longer" and urged the conference "to proceed to substantive negotiations." He said Western efforts to set up effective controls in Laos amounted to "procrastination," which he said "will never ensure a peaceful situation."

The contending factions in Laos continue to mark time while awaiting further talks among the three Laotian princes on the formation of a coalition government. The delay in the return of the various leaders from Europe makes it unlikely that talks can be resumed before mid-July at the earliest.

Souvanna Phouma has delayed his departure from Paris for another week to undergo an operation, while Souphannouvong, stopping over in Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi, is unlikely to reach the rebel headquarters in Xieng

SECRET

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

Khouang until this week end.  
Prime Minister Boun Oum, the  
first of the leaders to return,  
arrived in Vientiane on 30 June  
and General Phoumi on 4 July

following his visit to Washing-  
ton.

On his arrival in Vientiane,  
Boun Oum told the press that,



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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

after his concessions to Souvanna and Souphannouvong in the Zurich communiqué, it now was up to the opposition to show a "conciliatory" spirit. General Phoumi later claimed to the press in Bangkok that it had been agreed at Zurich that neither Souvanna nor Souphannouvong would be suitable as premier of a coalition government as both have been "too much involved" in the situation; this assertion, however, is unsubstantiated by any other reports on the meeting.


During brief stopovers in Bangkok en route to Vientiane, both Boun Oum and Phoumi held consultations with Marshal Sarit, who presumably argued for a hard line by the Vientiane government. There is evidence that Thai leaders view the situation in Laos with increasing alarm, and Ambassador Young, returning to Bangkok after a four-week absence, found the climate of opinion noticeably gloomier.

At a ceremonial reception the King took the ambassador aside to inform him that there was considerable confusion in the Thai Government and that the country was in danger. Premier Sarit also recently told the ambassador that he fears the effects of the Laotian situation may overtake Thailand before programs to strengthen the country have any impact. Foreign Minister Thanat has predicted that Laos will be lost to the Communists if the Zurich communiqué is implemented and a coalition government organized

under Souvanna; he also told the ambassador that "SEATO is all but lost."

The Laotian government, Pathet Lao, and Souvanna delegations assembled informally at Namone on 3 July in an effort to revive the stalemated political and military talks, but were unable to resolve their differences over whether the ICC should be permitted to attend the sessions. The Souvanna group has disputed the government's contention that an agreement to seat the ICC at the talks had been reached at Zurich. No temporary compromise could be reached, but another meeting is scheduled for 7 July.

Military action during the past several days has been limited to minor skirmishes, generally resulting from mopping-up activity by the opposing sides in their areas of control. The most noteworthy actions have been several probing attacks against government positions about 30 miles north of Vientiane and the occupation by anti-Vientiane forces of one post 30 miles north of Pak Sane.

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

## FRANCE-ALGERIA

Recent PAG actions indicate that French threats to partition the country have only stiffened the resolve of the provisional Algerian government (PAG) to maintain the indivisibility and territorial integrity of Algeria and the Sahara. The demonstrations against partition--staged in response to the PAG's call for a day of "national struggle" by Moslems in Algeria--also serve as a warning of more drastic use of the Moslem masses should France attempt to carry out its threat.

The PAG communiqué on 1 July stated that partition "would signify an indefinite prolongation of the war...and, far from guaranteeing the position of the Europeans in Algeria, would compromise their future definitively." French settler reaction has been obscured by the Moslem demonstrations.

ment of a truly independent Algerian state which included the Sahara.

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PAG was prepared to make significant concessions on bases, rights for European, and economic cooperation, but could never agree to the "amputation of four fifths of Algeria."

Top PAG leaders, meanwhile, have left for Morocco, Libya, the UAR, Mali, and Guinea in an effort to try to counter the French position that the disposition of the Sahara must be decided by all adjoining states. PAG premier Ferhat Abbas went to Rabat, minister of armaments Abdelhafid Boussouf is scheduled to visit Bamako and Conakry, and deputy premier Belkacem Krim has gone to Tripoli and Cairo.

Ahmed Boumendjel, one of the PAG negotiators, stated on 26 June that the PAG anticipated no change in the French position and expected that resumed talks would last at most only a few days and then be definitely abandoned. He said that it was clear that the French would not accept the establish-

They will probably succeed in obtaining strong statements of support from the non-Saharan states--the UAR and Guinea--as they did from Saudi Arabia. However, the border states--particularly those under Arab rule--are likely to do no more than soften their particular demands until an Algerian


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**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

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
settlement is reached and accord public gestures of support. The PAG, incensed particularly by Tunisian President Bourguiba's public stand that the Sahara is an "African problem," is probably also trying to muster sufficient support to force Bourguiba to modify his position. The US Embassy in Tunis notes that, since no communiqué was issued following the 1 July PAG meeting with Tunisian leaders, it is doubtful that any understanding was reached.

PAG statements that their "foreign ministry" would probably move from Tunis to Cairo-- "where contacts with Eastern and Arab states would be easier" --is not only a measure of PAG irritation with Tunis, but also suggests some hardening of the PAG position. The departure of the PAG leaders on their mission to the Sahara border states points up their refusal to make concessions and also suggests they feel that time is on their side and that international opinion will in the long run support them.



Paris has for some time conceded the inevitability of eventual independence for an Algeria minus the Sahara. Since the recess of the Evian negotiations, France has attempted-- notably with De Gaulle's remarks on regroupment and his announcement that withdrawal of army divisions was to begin--to force the issue and get the search for a settlement moving again. The public admission on 4 July by the French information director in Algiers that FLN support among the Moslems is "total" reinforces earlier indications by the French that they tacitly accept the PAG as the spokesman for the Moslem population, although formal French recognition is rigidly denied.

Should the bilateral negotiations be resumed, Paris will probably continue to refuse to turn over Algeria to the PAG without the formality of a referendum. An agreement between France and the PAG would permit both to support acceptance of the transfer in a referendum campaign. An agreement satisfactory to France would provide at least minimal military base rights and assure political guarantees to European settlers and pro-French Moslems.



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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

## KUWAIT

The British military build-up in Kuwait, which began with the landing of marine commandos from the carrier Bulwark on 1 July, has reached substantial proportions. London announced on 6 July that the movement of British troops into Kuwait had been completed but that some of the heavy equipment following by sea will arrive later. British strength in Kuwait now is greater than Iraqi strength in the Basra - Ash Shuaybah area of Iraq. Moreover, the regular Kuwaiti armed force of about 1,200 men has been supplemented

summer heat--inherent in retaining its forces there for any considerable period and whether it would be advisable for a UN or Arab force to replace them.

Most of the Iraqi people, including a number of anti-Qasim elements, have come to believe that Qasim's claim to Kuwait is valid and, if only for nationalistic reasons, they think that their country should eventually absorb Kuwait. Most Arab governments

continue

to oppose Iraq's "right" to annex Kuwait. However, Arab criticism of the British military presence is increasing, and the UAR has announced that it will not proceed with its plan to sponsor Kuwaiti membership in the United Nations until British troops are withdrawn. Arab League efforts to mediate the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute have so far achieved little; the "emergency" meeting of the league has been postponed until 12 July.

Kuwaiti representatives who arrived in New York on the evening of 4 July began presentation of their case before the UN Security Council on the following day. An extraordinary session of the Council on 2 July had heard arguments expounded by Iraqi and British delegates.

Soviet propaganda has followed up its initial factual account of the Kuwaiti crisis by accusing Great Britain of stepping up tension throughout the Arab world by its provocative action, and at the 5 July UN Security Council session, the Soviet delegate called for the "immediate withdrawal" of British troops from Kuwait. Moscow radio, meanwhile, continues to broadcast official denials from Baghdad of any Iraqi troop concentrations near the Iraq-Kuwait border.

In contrast to the rest of the Communist bloc, Peiping in effect took a public stand against Iraq in a message of 29 June welcoming Kuwait's independence. The Chinese were apparently surprised and concerned by the speed of the

It appears unlikely under these circumstances that Qasim will attempt a military move against Kuwait. An official statement issued by the Iraqi Foreign Ministry on 3 July claimed that Iraq had never intended to use any but peaceful methods to "restore its legitimate rights in Kuwait." The statement categorically denied that Iraq had concentrated troops anywhere and accused British "imperialism" of "spreading and fabricating reports" to justify the presence of British troops in the Persian Gulf area "under the pretext of protecting the Kuwaiti sheiks against an imaginary invasion."

Qasim, however, may soon undertake a dramatic anti-British gesture of a different sort. Among the possibilities would be government-organized demonstrations against the British Embassy in Baghdad, severance of diplomatic relations, or a move to nationalize the Iraq Petroleum Company.

London maintains that its forces will be withdrawn from Kuwait at the Ruler's request but does not anticipate that the crisis will subside sufficiently for such a request to be made until after 14 July--the third anniversary of Qasim's revolution. Britain now is considering its next moves, particularly the many problems--including Kuwait's extreme


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**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

UK troops' entry into Kuwait and decided that the main thrust of their propaganda should be the exploitation of Arab fears of returning British influence. A 4 July People's Daily editorial joined the rest of the bloc in condemning Anglo-American "imperialist intervention" in

Kuwait. The editorial reaffirmed Chinese support for Kuwait's independence, but declared that there were "two sides" to the "complicated" issue, which should be settled by peaceful negotiations among the Arab countries concerned.

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

## SOUTH KOREA

The ouster of Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong from the South Korean military junta on 3 July was a major move by Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui to establish his undisputed control of the present military regime. Chang, although largely a figurehead, was a potential rallying point for opposition to Pak.

Chang's removal was quickly followed by the arrest of three other members of the ruling Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) whose loyalty to Pak was doubtful and the removal from active duty of 40 general officers of the army, navy, air force, and marine corps.

The 40 officers removed were largely rear-echelon deadwood or had undesirable political affiliations. Some had been involved in past corruption, and the regime announced that all had "voluntarily" retired to make way for the promotion of junior officers.

In an obvious attempt to discredit the former civilian government, the regime has publicly accused former Prime Minister Chang Myon, who is South Korea's leading Roman Catholic layman, and 11 of his political associates of being Communist collaborators. A precedent has been established for similar action against intellectuals and students.

There are indications that Pak may next attempt to reduce the influence of the clique of younger field-grade officers in the SCNR who were prominent with him in the planning and execution of the 16 May coup.

Pak's brother-in-law, national security boss Lt. Col. Kim Chong-pil, is a leader of the impatient reform-minded younger element. As the head of the recently formed central intelligence agency, Kim has been moving to consolidate in police-state fashion all security affairs under his and presumably Pak's control. However, his loyalty to Pak is uncertain. Inasmuch as some of Pak's strongest support has come from the younger officer group, an attempt to reduce their power could precipitate a bitter and possibly violent power struggle within the junta.

25X1

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

## CONGO

Moderate Leopoldville politicians still have not adopted a common front on the policy to be followed toward the Stanleyville and Elisabethville regimes. The reconvening of parliament has consequently been further postponed, and an early meeting seems unlikely. Kasavubu on 5 July signed an order convening parliament on 15 July; however, the provision that the two houses will hold their actual first session on a date to be set by their outgoing presidents is expected to result in further delays.

There is growing friction among Mobutu, Foreign Minister Bomboko, and Interior Minister Adoula--who have been dominating the Leopoldville political scene. Adoula, who seems to have the broadest parliamentary support of any Congolese, has been advocating an early meeting of parliament. He has told American officials he hopes to reach a compromise with Gizenga, in which the Stanleyville leader would accept a minor role in a new government.

Mobutu and Bomboko, however, seem doubtful that the moderates can control the legislature, particularly if Katanga maintains its present separatist course and refuses to attend. Bomboko recently persuaded Kasavubu not to issue a decree calling for a parliamentary meeting on 3 July. He has since modified his position somewhat but still believes that extensive negotiations among the anti-Gizenga forces

are necessary before the legislature can be permitted to assemble.

Mobutu reportedly feels that too many concessions have already been made to the Stanleyville regime and is prepared to take issue with Gizenga on procedural as well as substantive matters. He stated recently that he, Tshombé, and the premier of Albert Kalonji's South Kasai state had agreed that the parliament buildings in Leopoldville, rather than Lovanium University on the edge of the city, should be the site of the parliamentary meeting. He stated further that if this should be unacceptable to Gizenga, the Legislature should convene without representatives from Stanleyville.

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Economic considerations are still putting pressure on Gizenga to come to terms with Leopoldville. The Stanleyville regime has fallen behind in payments to its troops, and Gizenga was forced to cancel an Independence Day parade on 30 June

**SECRET**

**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

because of the shortage of gasoline.

The first flight of a projected airline from Athens to Stanleyville via Cairo and Khartoum arrived in Stanleyville on 1 July. The airline allegedly is financed by Greek capital and the gold reserves of the Gizenga regime, but [redacted]

[redacted] believe that some of the backing came from the UAR. The airline would provide the first direct link between Stanleyville and the outside world and could furnish considerable material and moral support to Gizenga.

The Elisabethville regime continued its intransigent attitude toward Leopoldville on 4 July with a parliamentary resolution--passed with less

than a quorum present--repudiating agreements made by Tshombé before he left Leopoldville. The military agreement between Tshombé and Mobutu apparently is still in operation, and Mobutu has scheduled a visit to "his troops" in Katanga next week. [redacted]

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Tshombé's absence on "diplomatic leave" probably will preclude any early change in the Katanga position. In the meantime, UN officers who are negotiating with the Katangans over the retaining of Tshombé's forces report that Mobutu's representatives are doing little to establish their influence with the Elisabethville troops. [redacted]

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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Using the occasion of a visit to a new Czechoslovak industrial and commercial exhibition in Havana, Fidel Castro remarked on 28 June that "we who have undertaken the road of socialism are encouraged by all that they /the Czechs/ have achieved, and we are sure that our people will follow the same road victoriously." The Castro regime's official newspaper Revolucion said on 30 June that the Cuban premier may visit Czechoslovakia in August. This would be Castro's first visit to a bloc country.

Foreign Minister Raul Roa returned to Havana on 30 June after a 12-day stay in Prague and a three-day stopover in Mexico City following his participation in the preparatory conference of nonaligned nations in Cairo. He was apparently unsuccessful in an attempt to obtain an audience with Mexican President Lopez Mateos

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The Cuban delegation at Cairo, under Roa's aggressive leadership, successfully pressed to have Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador, and Bolivia invited to the forthcoming full conference, according to Roa; of these, only Brazil sent an observer to the Cairo meeting. There is as yet no evidence that any of these four nations plan to attend, however.

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**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****EAST GERMAN DISCONTENT**

As a result of Soviet prodding, party leader Ulbricht since December has followed certain "soft" policies toward the East German populace and has refrained for the most part from harassing West Berlin. The motives are to reduce public antipathy to his regime, to improve its image abroad, and especially to reduce the flow of refugees to West Berlin. He has encouraged East Germans to air their grievances by submitting petitions to the Council of State, which he heads, and has removed unpopular and ineffective officials on charges of "sectarianism." Above all, he gave the people reason to hope for a steady improvement of their unsatisfactory standard of living as well as for a diminution of party demands on professional men and intellectuals.

Whatever benefits may have accrued to the regime in terms of a less restive population, however, appear to have dissipated quickly with the USSR's current demands for a peace treaty. The people now are deeply concerned that a separate Soviet - East German treaty will

end hopes for German reunification, curb East German access to West Berlin, and mean the indefinite continuation of their drab existence.

Contributing to the change of public attitudes has been a coincidental period of sharp --although probably short-term --food supply difficulties. The US Mission in Berlin reports that, as a result of the unsatisfactory food situation and the threat to West Berlin, the population reflects a mood of "profound discouragement." Middle- and lower-level functionaries of the Socialist Unity party (SED) are openly blaming Ulbricht's collectivization policies for shortages of meat and dairy products. Industrial workers are said to be increasingly unresponsive to SED propaganda, because of the regime's inability to satisfy their demands for improved supplies of foodstuffs and consumer goods.

The mission also notes that a question put to Ulbricht by workers at the important Buna chemical plant on 26 June

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

indicated considerable anxiety as to why the USSR and East Germany were forcing the peace treaty issue at this time.

Ulbricht's "soft" policies, moreover, have not reduced the refugee flow: 19,198 East Germans fled this June, compared with 17,888 last June. The combined flow to West Berlin and West Germany during the first six months of 1961 totaled 103,159, as against 88,506 in the same period last year.

Ulbricht and his henchmen are seeking to convince the population through numerous public statements that the regime is here to stay, will inevitably be recognized by the Western powers, and will achieve international recognition as a United Nations member.

In an effort to alleviate discontent, the SED central committee plenum of 3-4 July issued a communiqué calling for priority attention to measures for improving the standard of living, such as "guaranteeing supplies of foodstuffs, industrial consumer goods, dwellings, and services to people."

The plenum also made major changes in the regime's top economic planning apparatus. Politburo member Bruno Leuschner has relinquished the chairmanship of the State Planning Commission, but he remains a deputy premier with the task of coordinating economic planning. As new chairman of the planning commission, Karl Mewis, former SED leader in Rostock District, will be responsible for short-term planning--a highly vulnerable spot.

Politburo member Alfred Neumann, who has had over-all charge of party cadre matters since 1957, is to head the newly created People's Economic Council--in charge of long-term planning at the Council of Ministers level. Erich Apel has moved from chief of the politburo's economic commission to become SED central committee secretary for economic affairs; he was also made a candidate member of the politburo.

Neither Mewis nor Neumann has had previous high-level economic planning experience. They apparently are to use their administrative talents along with Apel and Leuschner to make the economy workable. 25X1

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

## CROP AND LIVESTOCK PROSPECTS IN THE USSR

After two mediocre crop years, prospects for Soviet agriculture in 1961 appear better than average. An unusually mild winter and a favorable spring should assure a good winter grain crop in the European USSR, and larger herds and better feed supplies point to a somewhat better year for the livestock industry than 1960. Prospects for spring grain, however, are still uncertain, particularly in the important New Lands area where soil moisture reserves are low. Weather during the remainder of the growing season will be a critical factor.

In contrast to the previous year--when about 20,000,000 acres had to be reseeded to spring crops because of winter kill and spring dust storms--temperature and precipitation in the European USSR this past winter and spring averaged well above normal. The Soviet press has described the condition of winter grains as varying from "satisfactory" to "excellent." Plans for spring seeding, which was slowed somewhat by rains in late April and early May, have been overfulfilled for most major crops. The recent rains have interfered with the cultivation of spring crops, however, and since winter grains in the Ukraine are unusually tall, lodging may present a harvesting problem.

Spring came very early in the New Lands, and spring seeding, particularly in Tselina Kray in northern Kazakhstan, was completed earlier than in previous years. Precipitation

was near normal during the winter, but it tapered off in the spring, and soil moisture reserves at the end of May were low. In recent weeks the New Lands have experienced exceptionally high temperatures which have caused a rapid loss of soil moisture.

The relatively mild, moist winter and early spring have aided the Soviet livestock industry. The Soviets apparently entered 1961 with a considerably better feed supply and somewhat larger livestock herds than a year earlier. However, the total output of meat in the early months of 1961 was probably less than during the same period in 1960. According to Soviet reports, production at state slaughterhouses was 13 percent below that of the same period in 1960, when feed shortages caused distress slaughtering of livestock. State meat production during the first quarter of 1960 was 35 percent above that of the same period a year earlier.

There have been reports this past winter and spring of food shortages--particularly of meat. Apparently these shortages were mainly in quality foods and were not widespread or prolonged. Because of the great improvement in the supply of all types of food in the last decade and the regime's promises of improvements in the living standard, the average Soviet citizen probably expects more and is more likely to complain of a situation which in former years he would have accepted as normal. [REDACTED] (Prepared by ORR)

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

## YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER TO VISIT MOSCOW

Yugoslav Foreign Minister Popovic will begin a visit to the Soviet Union on 7 July, the first such high-level trip since the regime's trouble shooter, Vukmanovic-Tempo, journeyed there in January 1960. Popovic's trip was originally scheduled for early May but was postponed when Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko attended the Geneva conference on Laos. Since then, Popovic has had a full schedule, with a visit to The Netherlands in late May, attendance at the preparatory conference of neutral states in Cairo in early June, and the visit of Italian Foreign Minister Segni to Belgrade in late June.

The Popovic visit comes at a time of uneasiness in bloc-Yugoslav relations. While relations at the state level between Yugoslavia and the USSR are relatively normal, Belgrade was piqued by the original postponement of Popovic's visit, and recent propaganda from both states shows much basic animosity. In early June, a Moscow broadcast to Italy thoroughly condemned "Yugoslav revisionism," and Yugoslavia is currently publishing Dr. Zhivago despite past Soviet protests.

In addition, Yugoslavia has just published a 13-volume collection of Tito's memoirs, and portions thus far excerpted in Borba, Belgrade's leading daily, have portrayed Soviet foreign policy in the days leading up to World War II in a most unfavorable light. Presumably, similarly adverse descriptions of more recent Soviet policies will follow. Yugoslavia's relations with the other bloc states, with the exception of Poland and East Germany, range from poor to bad.

Belgrade probably believes that Popovic's visit will be beneficial, nonetheless, as a source of information and pres-

tige. The Yugoslavs hope to gain insights into current differences among members of the bloc--particularly the Soviet-Albanian feud--and will play up the trip as proof that the Kremlin cannot ignore Yugoslavia's role in international affairs, no matter how strongly it condemns Belgrade's "revisionism." Popovic may also hope to learn the extent to which Yugoslav ideology may be attacked in the coming debate of the theses for the 22nd Soviet party congress.

The Soviets, for their part, probably hope to gain greater Yugoslav support for their current foreign policies, particularly on the German question, since Yugoslavia is the only non-bloc state which maintains diplomatic relations with East Germany. Moscow may also hope to exert some influence on the neutralist summit conference scheduled to convene in Belgrade on 1 September. Shortly after the conclusion of the preparatory conference in Cairo, the Soviet chargé paid an urgent call on Tito.

The USSR will not find Popovic easy to deal with, primarily because Belgrade's hand has been strengthened by the neutrals' increased ability during the past year to act collectively on the international scene. While Belgrade has reiterated its general support of the Soviet line on Germany and Berlin, it has disapproved of the details of Khrushchev's scheme to reorganize the UN and of his plan to merge the nuclear testing and disarmament issues. The visit will demonstrate to Moscow that Belgrade's support cannot be expected on as many Soviet policies as a year ago. It could, therefore, exacerbate Soviet-Yugoslav relations rather than lead to greater cooperation in international affairs.

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

## COMMUNIST CHINA'S 40TH PARTY ANNIVERSARY

Peiping played down the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist party on 1 July. Domestic difficulties --including a dislocated economy and serious food shortages--probably loomed large in the regime's decision to avoid a gala celebration. The keynote speaker, Liu Shao-chi, admitted that "shortcomings in our work" as well as natural disasters had contributed to the present "temporary difficulties."

Liu's address was largely a reaffirmation of past party programs and provided few indications of how Peiping proposes to solve the problems some of its ill-conceived programs have raised. Liu endorsed as "absolutely right and entirely necessary" the "three red banners": the general line, the great leap forward, and the people's communes--Mao Tse-tung's hurry-up economic programs which contributed in large measure to China's present economic plight and its strained relations with Moscow. He revealed no economic goals for the coming year, calling only for "all-out support of agriculture" as a way out of the current difficulties.

Liu's fairly restrained and sober account of past history and of the present situation was in marked contrast to the tone of braggadocio adopted in major speeches several years ago when the leap-forward programs were just beginning.

Liu's speech contained only minimal praise for the Soviet Union. He acknowledged Moscow's

contributions in experience and aid and endorsed last year's Moscow conference. Soviet commentary on the anniversary cited China's "tremendous" contribution to the development of the world Communist movement. Unlike Peiping, however, Moscow did not give Mao personal credit for China's success and emphasized the long way Peiping must yet go to achieve socialism.

The continuing strain in Sino-Soviet relations was apparent in the communiqué issued in Moscow on 19 June following the signing of a new agreement on economic and technical cooperation. Conspicuously absent from the communiqué were any details as to the agreement reached. Agreement on major points at issue would be necessary if anything like the former schedule for the construction of large modern industrial facilities by the Soviets in China were to be met. It may be that neither party wishes public disclosure of what is probably a significant scale-down of Soviet economic commitments to China. It is also possible that no meaningful agreement has yet been reached and that Soviet economic activities in China will remain subject to short-term political factors.

The only clear-cut statement to date that Soviet economic assistance to China will continue at all was made by S. A. Skachkov, head of the government department which handles the USSR's foreign economic aid programs, at a reception following the signing of the agreement. He

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**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

said the Soviet party and government, and Khrushchev himself, have "paid more attention to the requests of the Chinese People's Republic" regarding economic and scientific cooperation, and that the Soviet Government will provide technical assistance to the Chinese from 1961 to 1967 in the construction and expansion of "large enterprises" in the metallurgical, chemical, oil, and machine-building industries and in the construction of hydroelectric power plants.

It appears from this that the new agreement is to cover the same period as the former one--through 1967--and that it entails Soviet assistance--although in what form is not clear--in similar sectors of China's heavy industry. The question of Soviet technicians has been left unanswered, although deliveries of complex Soviet industrial equipment would seem to require the presence of at least some Soviet technicians.

There is as yet no evidence that Sino-Soviet economic relations have improved significantly from the ambiguous state reached in the winter of 1960-61. Trade continues, although detailed information on key items and the quantities involved is lacking; business activity between the two countries appears on the surface to be "as usual"; both parties have been circumspect in statements concerning their economic relations. What has not been said indicates continuing strains in the relationship, and suggests that whatever

agreement has been reached was not achieved easily, was not as "satisfactory" as both sides allege, and does not constitute significant progress in restoring Sino-Soviet economic relations to their former state of meaningful cooperation.

On domestic affairs, Liu's speech disclosed that the Chinese party now has more than 17,000,000 members, an increase of 3,000,000 since 1959. He announced that Peiping would initiate a new "study" campaign--probably involving persuasion rather than the harsher methods of "rectification"--in order to overcome the confusion and loss of party morale which has resulted from the regime's recent setbacks. Liu endorsed the regime's "hundred flowers" policy toward intellectuals, also a policy of persuasion. He gave no indication of Peiping's intention to hold a party congress, which constitutionally should be called in 1961.

On foreign affairs, Liu reaffirmed Peiping's determination to liberate Taiwan--without specifying a time limit--and repeated Mao's characterization of President Kennedy as "more dangerous" than Eisenhower.

The quiet celebrations in Peiping were attended by Mao and all of his inner core of lieutenants except Chen Yun and Lin Piao. Peiping apparently did not invite guests from other Communist parties. [REDACTED] 25X1  
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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

## PEIPING ACCENTS PEACEFUL APPROACH TO THE TAIWAN ISSUE

Chinese Communist leaders have seized several opportunities recently to re-emphasize their "peaceful" approach to the Taiwan question. This tactic, probably dictated by Peiping's recognition that at present it lacks sufficient armed strength to force its way onto the island, does not preclude the use of force if a suitable occasion should arise.

Peiping's general outlook on the issue was articulated most recently by Liao Cheng-chih, central committee member and a leading spokesman on foreign affairs, to a touring group of Japanese businessmen

a transcript of Liao's remarks was telegraphed to Japan only after it had been checked and approved by the Chinese. According to this transcript, Liao explained that Communist China did not intend to try to take Taiwan with armed force since it feared such a course "might lead to a world war." He assigned no time limit to this forbearance, but intimated that it might take "five or ten or even thirty years" to settle the issue.

Other top Chinese leaders have been sounding the same note. Mao Tse-tung indicated

he had no intention of "shooting his way into a strong point like Taiwan." Foreign Minister Chen Yi is on record with a statement late last year that Communist China "will not start an attack." Last week, Chen told a Canadian television interviewing team that China hoped to settle the Taiwan dispute peacefully and was actively seeking such a solution.

In his talk with the Japanese, Liao discussed several "possibilities" for the eventual solution of the issue. He asserted that the problem might be solved by the departure of the Americans from the island, but that it would be necessary to "put pressure" on the US to achieve this end. There is, in fact, some evidence that Peiping is trying to stimulate "pressure" on the US by free-world nations which have taken the position that the continued confrontation of strong US, Chinese Communist, and Chinese Nationalist armed forces in the Taiwan area poses a serious threat to world peace.

Peiping's public statements contrast the "peaceful" Chinese approach to Taiwan with the persistent "aggressive" actions by the US in the area. To support this Peiping recently has stepped

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

up the number of "serious warnings" on alleged US "intrusions" into areas claimed by Peiping and has diminished its military pressure in the Taiwan Strait. Communist shelling of the offshore islands is at a low point. There was no artillery barrage when Vice President Johnson visited Taiwan in May; in contrast, President Eisenhower's visit a year earlier was greeted with a shelling of record intensity. In addition, Chinese Communist air forces have avoided several recent chances to engage Chinese Nationalist planes which ventured into mainland air space. However, this failure may have been due as much to technical as political considerations.

of US forces would significantly depress Chinese Nationalist morale and, perhaps, open the door to a deal with Taipei on terms favorable to Peiping. This "possibility" was discussed by Liao, who saw a chance that eventually "all, including Chiang Kai-shek, will return home." In this connection, the Chinese Communists continue their routine propaganda aimed at shaking Chinese Nationalist confidence in their American allies

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Recent public displays of displeasure in Taipei with the US over such developments as the overtures to Outer Mongolia have probably encouraged Peiping to think further along these lines.

Peiping has sought to convey the impression that all concessions in the past on the Taiwan issue have come from the Chinese side and that it is time for the US to take the initiative. Chou En-lai

At the same time, Peiping remains determined to avoid any diplomatic action which might be interpreted as formalizing the existing division between Taiwan and the mainland. The Communists still refuse to agree to US suggestions that they renounce the use of force in settling the problem, arguing that Peiping has every right to use force in an entirely domestic matter.

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the US must agree to withdraw its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. Chen Yi told his Canadian interviewers that any settlement of the Taiwan issue "depends entirely upon the US."

Peiping probably estimates that even a partial withdrawal

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

## JAPANESE REACTION TO PRIME MINISTER'S US VISIT

The reception accorded Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda during his visit to the United States and his own forthright assertion of Japanese views on international matters have received an overwhelmingly favorable response in Japan. As a result, Ikeda approaches a scheduled conservative party and cabinet reshuffle with probably greater personal popularity than when he first assumed office a year ago.

The Japanese press highlighted what it viewed as American recognition of Japan's importance to the free world and attention to Ikeda's views as signs that US-Japanese relations have entered a new era of partnership. Newspapers described Ikeda's explanation of Japan's position on such controversial issues as Chinese Communist representation in the UN and resumption of nuclear testing as possible only in a "frank exchange of views" between equals.

Political commentators welcomed the prospect of prior consultation on major US policy shifts as giving Japan equal standing with US allies in Europe. They regarded this as assurance that the Japanese Government will not be "left behind" in any review of China

policy, which they considered the "most important topic" of the Kennedy-Ikeda talks.

Several editorial writers have taken a new tack in pointing out that Japan's new international role will require the Japanese to accept increased responsibilities, especially in extending economic assistance to underdeveloped countries. The press previously has sought equality without acknowledging that it would involve additional Japanese obligations.

Editorial interest now is shifting to the domestic political consequences of the visit as Ikeda faces party and probable cabinet reorganizations this summer. Most Japanese political observers believe that the trip has strengthened his hand in consolidating his political power. Nevertheless, Ikeda's rivals in the ruling Liberal-Democratic party engaged in a form of mild opposition by initially refusing to be on hand at the airport to welcome the prime minister on his return on 30 June. The major factional leaders did finally attend, but this should not be regarded as evidence of their future cooperation with Ikeda. Acceptance or rejection of important cabinet and party posts in the forthcoming reshuffle will be a more reliable indicator.

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

## EARLY INDEPENDENCE SEEN FOR KENYA

Britain's Kenya colony appears headed toward early independence, despite recent political factionalism and instability. Jomo Kenyatta--the hero of the country's Africans who remains under detention at Maralal for his alleged role in managing the Mau Mau terrorists--has urged nationalist leaders to end their political squabbling and work together.

On 28 June, British Colonial Secretary Macleod announced that a conference would be held in Nairobi this year to consider a new constitution for Kenya and to discuss other pressing problems. Leaders of Kenya's two major African parties--in London to consider revising the organization which administers inter-territorial public services in East Africa--said Macleod had agreed to consider a plan for internal self-government under an African prime minister this year. Macleod's promise to study a new African demand for Kenyatta's release gave rise to widespread speculation in London that he would be set free within a few weeks.

Prior to elections last February for Kenya's single-chamber legislature, in which Africans achieved a majority for the first time, the two African parties campaigned for Kenyatta's freedom and stressed the importance of maintaining order. The absence of major incidents during the elections led most Africans to believe that Kenyatta would be released at once. They were disappointed and antagonized by Macleod's announcement that, while Kenyatta would henceforth be more accessible to African politicians, he would not be released until the security situation improved and the legislature began functioning satisfactorily.

Following that statement, the Africans engaged in a period of political bickering and maneuvering during which both parties refused to participate in forming a government. In mid-April, however, London persuaded the smaller of the parties to form a coalition government with European and Asian support. The other party retaliated by pursuing a policy of obstructionism designed to topple the "stooge" government; it walked out of the legislature during a stormy session and threatened to boycott that body.

A few days later, however, Kenyatta summoned leaders of both parties to Maralal, where he admonished them, particularly those in the opposition, and stressed unity of action. He urged the establishment of a joint consultative committee under his leadership to coordinate key policy issues in the legislature, allowing the two parties freedom of action only on unimportant issues.

The tenor of Kenyatta's remarks at Maralal suggests that he is willing to forego Kikuyu nationalism, a key factor in the five-year Mau Mau terrorism, and work for the independence of a united Kenya using parliamentary methods. All prominent African leaders and many settlers in Kenya have indicated a belief that conditions in the country will not improve until the release of Kenyatta, whom African nationalism has elevated to the status of near-deity. Nevertheless his return to active political life would intensify fears of Kikuyu domination among the minority tribes, bring about the eclipse of some relatively moderate leaders, and cause many Europeans and Asians to leave the colony.

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**SECRET****CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****GREEK POLITICAL SITUATION**

Passage of a new electoral law by the Greek Parliament on 23 June has introduced a pre-election atmosphere. There are reports of possible electoral coalitions and of imminent defection from one party to another. There is no indication, however, that the government has decided when to call elections. The most probable periods are September-October 1961 or April-May 1962. Greek national elections are held every four years, and new ones must take place by May 1962.

The new electoral law, a product of long and acrimonious debate, is described as providing for "reinforced proportional representation." It requires two allocations of seats, the first allocation based essentially on simple proportional representation. Participation in the second distribution--the seats not allocated in the first--will be limited to those parties polling a specified percentage of the total vote: 15 percent for single parties, 25 percent for two-party coalitions, and 30 percent for coalitions of three or more parties. All elections after the next one will be under a majority system in which the party gaining the largest number of votes in a district wins all seats in that district.

Having secured the new law, the moderate-rightist party of Premier Karamanlis can be expected to try to regain some of the support it has lost since 1958, when it won 170 of the 300 seats in Parliament with 41 percent of the popular vote. Moves anticipated include settling farmers' debts, raising prices for agricultural products and wages for urban workers, and giving widespread publicity to all government efforts to lift the standard of living. Karamanlis also has been reported contemplating changes in his government to bring in more ef-

fective leadership. Efforts to encourage defections by prominent opposition politicians reportedly are also under way.

The non-Communist opposition parties which make up the political center remain fragmented, and the public is apathetic to their attempts to win support. A provision of the electoral law that at least three parties will share in the second distribution of seats was publicized by the government as a concession designed to strengthen the center. It appears more likely, however, to prevent the unification of the center and thus may further weaken the non-Communist opposition. At least two of the several center parties appear hopeful of being the third party behind the two largest parties, the government party and the Communist-front EDA. In 1958 the parties of the center won about 34 percent of the popular vote, but they seem to have lost much of this support since then.

EDA, meanwhile, faces the forthcoming national elections with a large, well-organized party and the support of the proscribed Communist party of Greece. In 1958, EDA surprised many Greek political analysts by winning nearly 25 percent of the popular vote to become the major opposition party. In 1952, the last previous election in which EDA ran as a single party, it had captured less than 12 percent of the vote. Today EDA is estimated to have the support of at least 30 percent of the electorate. EDA spokesmen have called for a popular front--at least an electoral coalition--with the center parties to defeat Karamanlis. No party leader has yet accepted the offer, but several are believed negotiating with EDA. Should no coalition be formed, several individual deputies from nationalist opposition parties may defect to EDA.

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Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt



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